Monday 5 August 2013

China can still grow at high rates. Justin Yifu Lin

"After three decades of 9.8% average annual GDP growth, China’s economic expansion has been slowing for 13 consecutive quarters – the first such extended period of deceleration since the economic policy reform, was launched in 1979. Real GDP grew at an annual rate of only 7.5%  of this year".
There is a growing bearishness among investors and anxiety over the future rate growth of its economy.Many
expecting an unavoidable hard landing.
Mr Justin Yifu Lin a former chief economist and senior vice president  of the World Bank says: "
China’s economic slowdown since the first quarter of 2010 has apparently been caused mainly by external and cyclical factors. Facing an external shock, the Chinese government should and can maintain a 7.5% growth rate by taking counter-cyclical and proactive fiscal-policy measures, while maintaining a prudent monetary policy. After all, China has high private and public savings, foreign reserves exceeding $3.3 trillion, and great potential for industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvement".
Indeed, China can maintain an 8% annual GDP growth rate for many years to come, because modern economic growth is a process of continuous technological innovation and industrial upgrading. One can argue that this is the same for developed economies,but there is a fundamental difference, the latter have always been on the frontier of R&D which is costly and risky.
 By contrast developing countries benefit from the “latecomer’s advantage”: technological innovation and industrial upgrading can be achieved by imitation, import, and/or integration of existing technologies and industries, all of which implies much lower R&D costs".
According to the Growth Commission led by Nobel laureate Michael Spence, "13 economies took full advantage of their latecomer status after World War II and achieved annual GDP growth rates of 7% or higher – at least twice as high as developed countries’ growth rates – for 25 years or longer.
China became one of the 13 economies after 1979. Because the country’s latecomer status explains its 33 years of rapid economic growth", the key to understanding its potential for further rapid growth in the future lies in estimating how large those advantages still are.
"Per capita GDP, which reflects a country’s average labor productivity and its overall technological and industrial achievement, is a useful proxy to estimate latecomer’s advantage. That is, the per capita GDP gap between China and developed countries essentially reflects the gap between them in terms of overall technological and industrial achievement.
According to the most up-to-date estimate by the late economic historian Angus Maddisson, China's per capita GDP in 2008 was US$ 6725, which was 21% of per capita GDP in the United States. That is roughly the same gap that existed between the US and Japan in 1951, Singapore in 1967, Taiwan in 1975, and South Korea in 1977 – four economies that are also among the 13 successful economies studied by the Growth Commission. Harnessing their latecomer’s advantage, Japan’s average annual growth rate soared to 9.2% over the subsequent 20 years, compared to 8.6% in Singapore, 8.3% in Taiwan, and 7.6% in South Korea.
China’s annual growth potential should be a similar 8% for the 2008-2028 period. To realize its potential growth as a latecomer, China needs, above all, to deepen its market-oriented reforms, address various structural problems, and develop its economy according to its comparative advantages".

China's Outbounds Investments

In 2010 KPMG published a study of China's outbounds investments, the report found that although
chinese companies had made progress towards their goal to become Global players,they still needed
more to fullfill world class aspirations.
"Since the turn of this century, China’s rapid economic growth and a deepening reform and opening-up program have propelled a large number of stronger Chinese companies to pursue a “going out” strategy to expand into new markets, secure resources, and enhance their core competitiveness".

In 2012 KPMG made a second survey and interviews, and has issued a new report .
China’s outbound investment has gone through three stages:
Stage I: Initial stage from the late 1970s to the mid-late 1980s
Stage II:Transition period from 1991 to 2003, marked by the establishment of
offshore procurement and sales channels
Stage III: Rapid development from 2004 to present, China’s outbound
investment has developed quickly, stimulated by a series of positive factors,
including the fundamental business need for Chinese companies to expand
overseas, favorable policies and regulations, massive foreign exchange
reserves, and the appreciation of the renminbi against international currencies.
In 2012, the total value of outbound investments made by China’s non-financial
enterprises reached USD 77.2 billion, representing a remarkable 44.3%
compound annual growth over the period since 2003. China’s outward direct
investment has already reached the same level as the average outward direct
investment of six of the G7 countries (i.e. Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
Italy and Canada).
  There is a tendency to invest in projects at the lower scale of the value chain.

Recently, outbound investment in
manufacturing has experienced an increase but resource acquisitions remain the
dominant sector. Average deal size has come down as a result of an increasing
number of Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”) and Privately Owned
Enterprises (“POEs”) beginning to participate in outbound investments, as well
as a growing number of transactions outside of the natural resources sector
where the deal sizes are typically large.

Source: KPMG

.

Assessing FDI relationships between China, Japan and the U.S.

Theresa M. Greaney a*,and Yao Li  b
a
Department of Economics, University of Hawaii
b
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of
China

"We find evidence that Japanese affiliates in China are more concentrated in manufacturing industries and are more export-oriented than their American counterparts, but the
latter difference is shrinking over time.
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem of trade helps in explaining China’s trade pattern.
 With the largest population in the world and relatively low
wages, China has comparative and even absolute advantage in manufacturing labor-intensive
products relative to most of its trading partners. As China has increasingly integrated into the
world economy over the past three decades, it has evolved into a major exporter in most
categories of labor-intensive manufacturers, as predicted by the H-O theorem.
This framework indicates that an increase in a country’s inward FDI flows will dampen
 its trade growth.
More recent theories that incorporate multinational enterprise production into models of
international trade develop two different hypotheses to explain the relationship between FDI and
trade flows. In vertical integration models such as Helpman (1984), the primary incentive for
FDI is to seek lower production costs in the host country and then to export goods produced or
processed by the firm’s foreign affiliates. This type of FDI inflow will increase a host country’s
trade, primarily through increased exports.2
 On the other hand, a host country’s trade is predicted to decrease in horizontal integration models (such as Horstmann and Markusen), 1992 where FDI inflows substitute for imports.
 In this case, firms move the production of their
exportable products to the host country to economize on firm-level economies of scale, avoid
trade barriers and reduce transportation costs.
Gu, Awokuse, and Yuan (2008) and Xing (2007) examine the recent relationship
between trade and FDI for China. Gu et al. use disaggregated manufacturing sector data for
1995–2005 to conclude that China’s FDI inflows have statistically significant and positive effects
on China’s total exports, but these effects differ across industries.
With trade data from 1980 to With trade data from 1980 to
2004, Xing (2007) investigates to what extent FDI promoted intra-industry trade between China
and its major trading partners, Japan, and the US. The analysis indicates that Japanese direct
investment in China performed a significant role in enhancing intra-industry trade between
Japan and China. However, there is no such evidence found for the US direct investment in
China
With trade data from 1980 to
2004, Xing (2007) investigates to what extent FDI promoted intra-industry trade between China
and its major trading partners, Japan, and the US. The analysis indicates that Japanese direct
investment in China performed a significant role in enhancing intra-industry trade between
Japan and China. However, there is no such evidence found for the US direct investment in
tra-industry trade between China
and its major trading partners, Japan, and the US. The analysis indicates that Japanese direct
investment in China performed a significant role in enhancing intra-industry trade between
Japan and China. However, there is no such evidence found for the US direct investment in
China''.

Precious Metals

Gold Prices Futures            3 months        US$  1,300.89

Silver Prices Futures           3 months       US$       19.68

U.S. Service sector growth accelerated in July

U.S. Non-Manufacturing Index 56, expected 53.

EU Indicators

                                                 
                                              Expected                       Real

Italy Markit Services               46.5                             48.7

Germany Markit                      52.5                             51.30
Markit Services

EUR Markit Services              49.6                              49.80

EUR PMI Composite              50.4                              50.5

GBP Markit Services              57.2                              60.2
PMI

EUR Sentix Investor               -10                                -4.9
Confidence

EUR Retail Sales                    -1.2                               -0.9

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